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COVERNANCE: FEMINIST THEORY, THE ISLAMIC VEIL  
AND THE STRASBOURG COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON RELIGIOUS 
DRESS-APPEARANCE RESTRICTIONS 
 
Amina Haleem 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores how the human right of religious freedom has been conceptually and 
pragmatically developed under international law within the European Court of Human Rights as 
applied to veiled Muslim women. This paper analyzes the application of human rights 
guarantees as established in the European Convention on Human Rights and case law 
established by the European Court that has interpreted international documents to determine the 
religious freedoms of veiled Muslim women in the public sphere. The analytical framework 
identifies the divergence between liberal and third wave feminist approaches to the Islamic veil, 
and identifies the feminist approaches to international human rights. 
The European Court has staunchly upheld governmental restrictions on Islamic veiling 
across Europe under Article 9 of the European Convention. This has disparately impacted 
religious freedom of Muslim women and their ability to manifest religion through their dress-
appearance. Challenging the Court’s normative application, and discriminatory outcomes, of 
Article 9 jurisprudence through postmodern and postcolonial feminist interpretations of 
religious freedom may provide an opportunity to strengthen and elevate diverse female voices, 
like those of veiled Muslim women, in the review of dress appearance restrictions. Challenging 
Article 9 jurisprudence will help break the institutionalization of a harmful stereotype of the 
Islamic veil that relegates religious women to the darkest corners of European society. Women 
who have made a conscious choice to wear the Islamic veil need governmental and judicial 
protection of their religious freedom and of the ability to embrace the dynamic aspects of their 
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gender, religion, identity, and autonomy in a secular Western society. Without this protection, 
veiled women will continue to live under a restrictive form of covernance - a discriminatory 
system of governance that restricts the way they manifest their religious belief by covering their 
bodies in the public sphere. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Does the scarf- in and of itself- threaten society?”1  This simple question, posed by 
Amos N. Guiora, in his article “The Threat of Religious Extremism,” is at the heart of an 
ongoing and transformative European debate on the role of Islam in European secular 
democracy. Islamophobia is defined as “irrational hostility, fear, or hatred of Islam, Muslims, 
and Islamic culture, and active discrimination against these groups or individuals within them.”2 
While Muslims of all races, genders, and age groups have been victims of Islamophobia, 
noticeably, veiled Muslim women are increasingly direct targets of Islamophobic political 
rhetoric and legislative measures. 
A growing anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic trend is expanding across Europe. 
Decolonization, labor programs, and refugee migration have led to an increasing Muslim 
presence in western and northern Europe, but one of the most contentious social issues centers 
around the Islamic veil. 3  It is more so an issue in these parts of Europe as opposed to Eastern 
and South East Europe where “headscarves are part of the normal female dress . . . and are not at 
all typical of Islamic countries alone.”4  
Conservative politicians who propagate a divide between “Islam and the West” benefit 
immeasurably by conflating radicals with all other Muslims citizens in Europe.  This type of fear 
mongering has increased since September 11, and can be highlighted by the January 2015 
Charlie Hebdo attack where the French newspaper,  
                                                
1 Amos N. Guiora, The Threat of Religious Extremism, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 743, 767 (2009). Guiora is a law lecturer 
and co-director of the Center for Global Justice at the University of Utah. 
2 Islamophobia in Europe, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, (April 2015), 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/islamophobia-europe. 
3 The term “Islamic veil” is used to describe all methods of veiling and hereinafter will be used to include the hijab, 
the niqab, and the burqa.  
4 Peter Antes, Islam in Europe, in RELIGION IN EUROPE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 51, 46-61 (Sean Gill, et al. 
eds., 1993).  
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in its raucous, vulgar and sometimes commercially driven effort to offend every 
Islamic piety, including the figure of the Prophet Muhammad, became a symbol of 
an aggressive French secularism that saw its truest enemy in the rise of conservative 
Islam in France, which is estimated to have the largest Muslim population in 
Europe.5  
 
The attack was undoubtedly inexcusable, but Islamophobia and xenophobia have taken 
center-stage in the socio-political effort to marginalize Islamic influences as “the main threat to a 
so-called European identity.”6  They have also influenced the direction of international human 
rights law in Europe. 
European regulations on variations of the Islamic veil are a noticeable trend in France, 
Belgium, Turkey, Denmark, and towns in Switzerland, Russia, Italy, and Spain.7  Arguments 
supporting Islamic veil bans are centered on the importance of secular democracy to a well-
functioning European society.  However, states have been selective in enforcing secular values 
when confronting Islamic cultural and religious traditions. For example, in the 1980s, French 
politicians, feminists, and members of the public decried the hijab in public schools, but at the 
same time, “the French government quietly permitted immigrant men to bring multiple wives 
into the country.”8  Thus, the concern about the hijab’s non-Western and negative influence a 
liberal and secular society falters when compared to polygamy in the same secular society. Both 
aspects of non-Western culture have, in the eyes of universal liberalists, undesirable implications 
on gender equality, but only the veil is more noticeably featured in the West as a distinctive 
marker of female subservience.  
                                                
5 Steven Erlanger & Katrin Bennhold, ‘Dangerous Moment’ for Europe, as Fear and Resentment Grow, N.Y TIMES 
(Jan. 8, 2015), at A1. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/paris-attack-reflects-a-
dangerous-moment-for-europe.html?_r=0. 
6 Islamophobia and the Next European Parliament, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_islamophobia_and_the_next_european_parliament262. 
7 The Islamic Veil Across Europe, THE BBC, (July 1 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13038095. 
8 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, in CURRENT ISSUES IN LAW AND RELIGION 331, 331-47 
(Rinaldo Cristofori et al., eds., 2013). 
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The regulations on the Islamic veil have been the subject of increased international 
litigation in recent years. The European Court of Human Rights’ (the “Strasbourg Court”) 
religious dress-appearance jurisprudence has established that restrictions, and even outright bans, 
on the Islamic veil in public forums do not violate the freedom of religion if they are necessary in 
a democratic society and are proportionate to a legitimate state goal.9  This issue is most 
prominently illustrated in the 2014 case of S.A.S. v. France where the Strasbourg Court applied a 
wide margin of appreciation to a French law that prohibited concealing one’s face in public, 
except under certain circumstances.10  In upholding the ban, the Court deferred to the French 
goal of “living together” and promoting uninhibited interaction between individuals.11  The 
Court accepted France’s argument that “the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the 
face . . . breach[es] the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living 
together easier.”12  
The normative structure of European secularism indulges in discriminatory cultural and 
religious assumptions about the Islamic veil.  It compounds the conflict between gender equality 
and religious freedom.  The consequences of failing to harmonize these rights within the 
European interpretation of human rights law disproportionately forces veiled Muslim women to 
sacrifice an aspect of their religious identity and individual autonomy.  Further, the Strasbourg 
Court’s jurisprudence upholding these dress-appearance restrictions perpetuate the liberal 
                                                
9 S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R ¶¶ 157-62 (2014). Available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145466. (The Court dismissed the argument by the 
applicant, a French Muslim woman, that the law indirectly discriminated against Muslim women. The Court 
reasoned that although the law clearly affected some Muslim women negatively, the law did not target the religious 
element of the veil and therefore it had an objective purpose. Unfortunately, the Court’s dismissal of the law’s 
indirect discriminatory effects on veiled Muslim women underlies the liberal feminist framework, which preserves 
religious and cultural discrimination in favor of Western imperialism. By placing more value on the rights of others 
to freely interact in society, the Court is effectively condoning France’s marginalization of Islamic practices in its 
public sphere.) 
10  Id. at ¶ 129, ¶ 155. 
11  Id. at ¶ 142, ¶ 157. 
12  Id. at ¶ 122. 
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feminist presumption that the veil, and its meaning in Western society, are fundamentally 
incompatible with secular democracy and modern gender equality. 
Part II of this paper provides background on the Strasbourg Court and explains the 
Court’s evaluation process of claims of religious discrimination.  It also provides the provisions 
of Article 9 of the European Convention and notes the bifurcation of religious freedom into two 
categories: the freedom of conscience and the manifestation of religious belief.13  
Part III identifies liberal feminism and postmodern/postcolonial feminism as competing 
theories through which to understand the Islamic veil’s significance in the European public 
sphere.  It critiques liberal feminism’s perpetuation of the “false consciousness” theory and 
victimization of veiled Muslim women in a patriarchal religion. It further identifies 
postmodern/postcolonial feminism as alternative agency-based theories that denounce the liberal 
feminist “othering” of Muslim women and that account for the various facets of a woman’s 
identity and religious agency. 
Part IV critiques European secular governance as a restrictive and discriminatory norm 
that diminishes the cultural and religious autonomy of veiled Muslim women.  It asserts that the 
Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of secular governance as applied to dress-appearance restriction 
claims inhibits Islamic veiling in the public sphere through a stereotypical and harmful 
understanding of the veil’s role in shaping a Muslim woman’s religious and gender identity.  The 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence endorses a particular normative European governing structure 
                                                
13 There are several relevant issues regarding contemporary religious freedom that are beyond the scope of my thesis 
and will not be the subject of analysis in this paper. These issues include the impact of legal and social restrictions 
within Muslim-majority non-Western countries on gender inequality, the effects of religious freedom jurisprudence 
out of international tribunals on men who manifest their religious beliefs through dress-appearance like Sikh and 
Jewish men, and the comparison of the European form of secularism and democracy to other Western structures. 
This paper will only address the rights of, and restrictions on, Muslim women to wear Islamic veils in European 
societies. 
 
 
7 
that views Islamic veiling as an unfavorable religious practice in secular democratic society.14 
Part IV will also explain that a critical shift in the theoretical analysis of the Islamic veil, from a 
liberal feminist approach to a postmodern/postcolonial approach, in the context of gender 
equality is necessary to achieve greater religious freedom under international law because it 
allows Muslim women to embrace their identity and culture in different settings.  Part V will 
conclude and highlight the implications of a shift in feminist theoretical analysis of dress-
appearance restrictions for the future of international religious freedom law.  
II. BACKGROUND ON THE STRASBOURG COURT AND ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention) is a regional human rights instrument that requires member states of the Council of 
Europe to protect individual rights.15  It entered into force in 1953 and established the European 
Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, France.16  The Court has jurisdiction to hear claims 
arising under the Convention against state parties.17  The Court functions to uphold the 
“subsidiary” principle ensuring that sovereign states are the primary vehicle to protect human 
rights under the Convention at the national level and in domestic courts.18  The European 
                                                
14 See generally Carolyn Evans, The ‘Islamic Scarf’ in the European Court of Human Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT'L. L. 
52, 59-60 (2006) (Evans discusses the contradictory stereotypes that the Court perpetuates of veiled Muslim women 
and girls, namely that they are on one hand, oppressed victims in desperate need of liberation and protection from 
religious oppression, and that they are simultaneously aggressors perpetuating fundamentalist values by 
proselytizing by simply wearing the veil. In both instances, these women are somehow a threat to the liberal, 
egalitarian order).  
15 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 
230 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
16 Id. at art. 19. 
17 Id. at art. 32.  
18 Jilan Kamal, Justified Interference with Religious Freedom: The European Court of Human Rights and the Need 
for Mediating Doctrine Under Article 9(2), 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 669 (2008). 
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Convention bifurcates religious freedom in Article 9.19  Religious freedom, in a broad sense, 
encompasses specific rights including:  
[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the right to equal 
protection of the law, including the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
religion, the right of persons belonging to religious minorities to profess and practice 
their religion, and the right to protection from incitement to discrimination, hostility, 
or violence.20  
 
However, while freedom of conscience is absolute, the right to manifest religion is not. 
This distinct categorization of rights has practical implications in the lives of religious adherents, 
especially because the theoretical underpinnings of human rights have “failed to harmonize 
freedom of religion . . . or to confront the consequences of this failure.”21  
The Strasbourg Court has interpreted the Convention to be a “living instrument” that 
decides modern social issues including but not limited to “assisted suicide, strip searching, 
domestic slavery . . . adoption by homosexuals, the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in schools 
and universities . . . and environmental concerns.”22  The Court has focused on fundamental civil 
and political rights claims, and in the particular context of this paper, claims arising under the 
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Article 9 of the European Convention states23  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone 
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
                                                
19 European Convention on Human Rights, art 9 at 10-11.  
20 Peter G. Danchin, The Tangled Law and Politics of Religious Freedom, 10 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 73, 89-90 
(2012). 
21 Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, 
and Women's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 367, 397-98 (2007). 
22 The ECHR in 50 Questions, COUNCIL OF EUROPE. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf. 
23 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9 at 10-11. 
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the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
The Convention’s language grants individuals an absolute right to freedom of belief 
under 9(1), but 9(2) curtails the individual's right to “manifest” that belief in the public sphere. 
Article 9(2), also known as the limitations clause, provides the threshold test for restrictions on 
the freedom to manifest a religious belief externally as an act of religious observation.  Article 
9(2) requires that the state legislation must be “(1) directed toward a legitimate aim; (2) carried 
out pursuant to domestic law; and (3) necessary in a democratic society.”24  
The third prong is also known as the democratic necessity test.  According to the 
Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, the democratic necessity test splits into a balancing 
examination of “whether the state action is “necessary” and whether it is “proportional” to its 
stated goal.”25  First, the state must prove that the action or observation is truly a manifestation of 
religious belief.26  Second, the law in question must in fact constitute an interference with the 
particular manifestation.27  Finally, the Strasbourg Court’s inquiry turns to whether the state’s 
interference is justified under the test of Article 9(2).28  
The European Convention is a legal instrument through which to protect individual 
freedoms of conscience and belief but, as will be discussed later, can also be used to legitimize 
state laws that curtail those freedoms in order to meet a particular social and secular standard.   
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND THE ISLAMIC VEIL  
Feminist theory began as marginalized discourse, but years of advocacy have culminated 
in a “noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power,” 
                                                
24 Id.  
25 Kamal, supra note 18 at 681-82. 
26 Id. at 677. 
27 Id. at 678. 
28 Id.  
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something Janet Halley, Royall Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, calls governance 
feminism.29  Governance feminism refers to, “feminism that seeks not only to analyze and 
critique the problem, but to devise, pursue and achieve reform to address the problem in the real 
world.”30  Governance feminism incorporates feminist theory in the creation of law and policy 
within non-feminist structures of power.31   
This section will discuss the roles of liberal and postmodern/postcolonial feminism in 
relation to Islamic veil restrictions in the public sphere.  Halley principally refers to governance 
feminism as a tool for international policing and criminalization of forms of sexual violence, but 
it also plays a role in the way the Strasbourg Court maintains a particular normative and liberal 
European social order that marginalizes Islamic veiling as an unfavorable and incompatible 
religious practice. 
Religious and cultural practices from many faiths have clashed with Western secular 
governance in the past, especially in the area of women’s rights.  In 1993, the U.N. Vienna 
World Conference on Human Rights focused on the process of eradicating harmful practices 
against women including sexual violence and sex trafficking by “fram[ing] the conflict between 
the rights of women and culture.”32  This conference significantly contributed to the debate on 
international women’s rights by aiming to distinguish between “authentic” and “extremist” 
                                                
29 Janet Halley et. al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex 
Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 2, 340 
(2006). 
30 Id. at 348 (Halley’s definition here is applied to the increasing feminist involvement in shaping the text and the 
enforcement of international law criminalizing against sex trafficking; however the definition of governance 
feminism can also be applied broadly to other aspects of feminist advocacy that influences the norms of legal norms 
and structural governance.) 
31 Id. at 340 (The term is described as the “incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists and 
feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power.”) 
32 Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-16 (2000) (citing the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, art. 38, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (1993)). 
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cultural and religious values.33  Unfortunately, the Conference could not resolve the 
disagreement between zealous liberal women’s rights advocates and cultural relativists who 
defended exceptions to universal applications of human rights principles.34  One such issue is the 
religious dress of Muslim women.  
Due to the complexity of feminist theory, there is no “single global perspective through 
which to criticize flawed international legal constructs and to suggest methods for change” of 
gender inequality.35  This creates a division between feminists and prevents a comprehensive 
understanding of the Islamic veil’s influence on female identity.  Although two distinct human 
rights, the freedom of conscience and the freedom to manifest belief are interconnected and carry 
practical meaning for veiled Muslim women.  
A. Liberal Feminism and False Consciousness 
The practice of wearing the Islamic veil is viewed as a direct contradiction to liberal 
feminist values.  Liberal feminism is based on the fundamental principle that all persons must be 
treated equally under the law, irrespective of individual and unique characteristics.36  In 
particular, the emphasis was on women’s equality to men and the attempt to overcome 
established sex-based discrimination against women. Cyra Akila Choudhury, assistant law 
professor at Florida International University, describes the liberal feminist approach to the 
Islamic veil and the idea of false consciousness, stating, “a veiled woman is by the very fact that 
she wears a veil oppressed.  In order to be free, the veiled woman must progress out of the veil. 
                                                
33  Id. at 16.  
34  Id. 
35 R. Christopher Preston & Ronald Z. Ahrens, United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theory, 
8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4-5 (2001). 
36 Id. at 7. 
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Such reductionism imagines veiled Muslim women as being nothing more than victims of their 
circumstances.”37  
Under the liberal feminist theory, states must create and apply gender-neutral laws, but 
this naturally assumes that “a state is a neutral actor, free from gender bias and able to enforce 
the law equally to both men and women.”38  Peter Danchin explains that complete neutral 
governance39 of religious freedom in a pluralistic nation-state is impossible because states are 
unable to truly decipher between religious and non-theistic practices.40  Though this may be true, 
the liberal feminism approach still leaves both states and courts without concrete guidance to 
create and implement policies that identify particularized religious observances because it 
“cannot be done in a neutral way.”41 
Liberal societies that relegate religion to the private sphere diminish the importance of 
engaging religion in the public sphere.42  Liberal feminists are “highly critical in their 
interpretation of particular religious practices” and believe that efforts to reconcile religious 
freedom and secularism will compromise significant advances of gender equality as a state 
priority.43  Under this theory, the Islamic veil contradicts the essence of gender equality because 
it is a marker of patriarchal control, female subordination, and sexual repression.  
This sentiment is directly made clear in Phyllis Chesler’s piece, “The Burqa: Ultimate 
Feminist Choice?” criticizing another feminist author, Naomi Wolf, on her perception of the role 
                                                
37 Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal Feminism's Visions of the "Progress" of Muslim 
Women, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 153, 158-59 (2009). 
38 Preston & Ahren, supra note 35, at 7. 
39 Danchin, supra note 20, at 74. (States are required to be neutral “between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion”). 
40 Id. at 74-75 (citing Lautsi v. Italy [GC],  no. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (2011). Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf (A majority of the Grand Chamber 
held that the right to religious freedom under Article 9 imposes a duty on the State of “neutrality and impartiality.”). 
41 Id. at 75. 
42 Choudhury, supra note 37, at 159-60 (citing Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399, 1402-05 
(2003)). 
43 Ellen Wiles, Headscarves, Human Rights, and Harmonious Multicultural Society: Implications of the French Ban 
for Interpretations of Equality, 41 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 699, 723-24 (2007). 
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the veil in modest Islamic culture.44  She identifies the veil as a marker of an unthinking, agency-
less woman to be pitied by generalizing that, “[m]ost Muslim girls and women are not given a 
choice about wearing the chador, burqa, abaya, niqab, jilbab, or hijab (headscarf) and those who 
resist are beaten, threatened with death, arrested, caned or lashed, jailed, or honor murdered by 
their own families.”45  She patronizingly overstates that, “Most Muslim girls and women are 
impoverished and wear rags, not expensive Western clothing beneath their coverings.”46   
Finally, Chesler laments that “being veiled and obedient does not save a Muslim girl or 
woman from being incested, battered, stalked, gang-raped, or maritally raped nor does it stop her 
husband from taking multiple wives and girlfriends or from frequenting brothels.”47 Chesler’s 
assertion that “most Muslim girls and women are not given a choice about veiling,” succinctly 
describes how liberal feminists feel about the veil, and how they believe “shrouded” Muslim 
woman to be “invisible.  They cease to exist.  They are literally ghosts.”48  Chesler does not 
differentiate between Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries, nor does she distinguish 
veiled Muslim women living in the West from Muslim women living in Islamic environments. 
Noticeably, the spiritual aspect of the Islamic veil is acutely brushed under the rug by a liberal 
feminist understanding of Islam.  It is not viewed as a belief system or a devout lifestyle, but as a 
culture that is incompatible with contemporary standards of freedom and gender equality. 
Limitations on a woman’s ability to manifest religious beliefs through her dress-
appearance “directly affects the choices . . . women may have to make about the public 
                                                
44 Phyllis Chesler, The Burqa: Ultimate Feminist Choice? THE PHYLLIS CHESLER ORGANIZATION (Aug. 31, 2009). 
http://www.phyllis-chesler.com/612/burqa-ultimate-feminist-choice (Chesler, professor of psychology and women's 
studies at the College of Staten Island, attributes the veil, specifically the burqa, to ignorant cultural practices in 
foreign countries). 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
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presentation of their persons.”49  Inflexible institutional mechanisms that restrict or ban religious 
dress to “protect the rights of others and in pursuit of other legitimate social goals”50 preserve 
negative socially constructed meanings of the Islamic veil in European countries, which serves to 
“otherize” Muslim women, demonstrating that their rights are not prioritized.  These 
misunderstandings are fueled by perceptions that, without exception, Islam perpetuates women’s 
inequality and oppression.51  
The restrictive dress policies of European states maintain a closely held expectation, 
emerging from liberal feminist theory, that “Muslims, particularly women, will eventually value 
the same rights and social orderings as those of their benefactors in the West.” 52  This means 
suggesting, and frequently demanding, that Muslim women identify and change unfavorable 
cultural practices that are products of patriarchal interpretations of religion.  Muslim women who 
reclaim their social power and personal autonomy are believed to have increased agency. 
However, this approach is riddled with Western cultural biases, especially when the Islamic veil 
is singled out as a particular “unfavorable” practice. 
Muslim women who defend the hijab as compatible with liberalism are dismissed by 
liberal feminists as victims of false consciousness.  Liberal feminists encourage Muslim women, 
especially those living in Western societies, to adopt secular Western values and they continue to 
measure the “progress” of a Muslim woman’s consciousness, education, and experience.53  The 
concept of false consciousness perpetuates the idea that Muslim women only believe that they 
                                                
49 Bennoune, supra note 21, at 392. 
50 Id. at 418. 
51 Choudhury, supra note 37, at 153. 
52 Id. at 153-54. 
53 Id. at 156. 
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are choosing to wear the Islamic veil for spiritual reasons but they are actually socially 
conditioned to wear it by “immediate family, friends, and socio-religious organizations.”54  
Although liberal feminism was once championed as the unifying philosophy of the 
gender equality movement, it has been steadily critiqued for its “reliance on male-dominated 
institutions and its narrow conception of equality.”55  The foundational argument against the 
Islamic veil is rooted in the belief that the veil is “inevitably damaging for women and for the 
cause of gender equality as a whole, even in societies where they are not a direct catalyst for 
violence against women or an element of a fundamentalist regime.”56 
B. Third Wave Feminism and Religious Agency  
A competing strain of feminism, third wave feminism encompassing postmodern and 
postcolonial feminist theories, critiques Western feminism as homogenized Eurocentrism that 
fails to value, appreciate or justify the non-Western woman’s experience.  Specifically, third 
wave feminism shifts the focus on important aspects of a woman’s culture and identity in 
relation to her gender.  
Postcolonial feminism analyzes the “intersection of gender, nation, class, race, and 
sexualities in the different contexts of women’s lives, their subjectivities, work, sexuality, and 
rights.”57  It seeks to remedy the victimization of non-Western women and the residual racism 
and oppression left from systemic colonization.  Postcolonial feminism also accounts for the 
points of view and voices of non-Western women instead of overshadowing them with a Western 
woman’s authoritative say-so. Because the focus is on giving a voice to the voiceless, a 
postcolonial analysis of the veil would likely lead to better identification of coercive tactics used 
                                                
54 Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, The French "Headscarves Ban": Intolerance or Necessity?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 235, 
247 (2006). 
55 Preston & Ahren, supra note 35, at 7-8. 
56 Wiles, supra note 43, at 718-19. 
57 Raj Kumar Mishra, Postcolonial feminism: Looking into within-beyond-to difference, 4 INT. J. ENGLISH LIT. 129, 
129-30 (2013).  
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by others to force a Muslim woman to cover, and highlight a woman’s choice to veil of her own 
free will or religious conviction.  The issues of choice and coercion will be discussed in section 
IV of this paper. Post-colonial feminism, even if imperfectly applied, would likely lead to less 
discrimination against veiled women because it actively seeks to hear their voices and 
understand their experiences.  
Similarly, postmodern feminism addresses the blind pressure that liberal feminists place 
on Muslim women to embrace non-Western ideals, break free of patriarchal beliefs, and “reform 
culture or religion in a way that comports with liberal notions of history and progress.”58 
Postmodern feminism recognizes that “the headscarf is a garment that is used and valued by 
some women for subjective reasons upon which it is not for others to cast judgment.”59 
Postmodern feminists traditionally consider that the right to manifest religion in a context-
specific way is necessary to account for the socially constructed meanings of religious 
expression and its impact on sex equality. Compared to liberal feminism, which presupposes 
sexist and oppressive hierarchies ensuring that women wear the Islamic veil, postmodern 
feminism creates space for veiled Muslim women to reclaim their agency through practicing and 
embracing their identity in different settings. Feminist literature has demonstrated that the veil is 
more than a controversial piece of cloth.  
Particular verses in the Qur’an60 have been interpreted in Islamic scholarship to establish 
the source of particular religious dress and to justify that the Islamic veil is a manifestation of 
                                                
58 Wiles, supra note 43, at 718-19 (“False consciousness alters women’s self-perception to make them believe that 
social roles, cultural traditions and religious practices are their own choice and not forced on them. The hijab is 
viewed as a symbol of oppression and female inequality.”) 
59 Id. at 722. 
60 See also The Quran, (“Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their 
chastity; not to display their adornments (except such as are normally revealed); to draw their veils over their 
bosoms and not to display their finery except to their husbands,” (24:31); “Prophet, enjoin your wives, your 
daughters, and the wives of true believers to draw their veils close round them. That is more proper, so that they may 
be recognized and not be molested” (33.59)”). 
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modesty, privacy, and morality.61 Some Muslim women have expanded the veil’s role to other 
aspects of their lives, including its facilitation of political statements. Nadiya Takolia, spiritual 
reasoning coordinator at the University of Cambridge, states that the hijab is a purely political 
tool used to empower her against the sexual objectification of modern society.62  She says, “I 
firmly believe that a woman's dress should not determine how others treat, judge or respect her,” 
and that any non-Muslim woman has an equal choice and opportunity to veil as well.63  Ellen 
Wiles, British human rights attorney and legal scholar, explains that Islamic veiling serves as “a 
constant physical reminder of that value in the course of their daily life, and an inalienable part 
of their religious identity.”64  Wiles also identifies secular reasons for wearing the Islamic veil.65 
Wiles directly critiques the assumption that the Islamic veil, as a cultural and religious symbol, is 
incompatible with the principles of gender equality.66  She admonishes liberal feminists who 
preach from a “pedestal of moral indignation.”67  
Sexuality is another aspect of the veil. Naomi Wolf, author and political activist, 
describes sexuality in Islam as “more conservatively directed” towards marriage, and speaks of 
the benefits of the hijab in a modest society.68  She emphasizes a woman’s choice to wear the 
veil as a literal and spiritual shield from “the intrusive, commodifying, basely sexualising 
                                                
61 Wiles, supra note 43, at 717. 
62 Nadiya Takolia, The Hijab has Liberated me from Society’s Expectations of Women, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 
2012). Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/28/hijab-society-women-religious-
political. 
63 Id.  
64 Wiles, supra note 43, at 717. 
65 Id. at 720-21 (Wiles explains that Muslim women wear the hijab to overcome sexual objectification, because they 
view it as a powerful political tool, and to project a particular cultural identity within society). 
66 Id. at 720. 
67 Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism: Reevaluating Gender Rights in A Multicultural Context, 
15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 113, 150 (1996). 
68 Naomi Wolf, Behind the veil lives a thriving Muslim sexuality, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 30, 2008). 
Available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/behind-the-veil-lives-a-thriving-muslim-
sexuality/2008/08/29/1219516734637.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1. 
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Western gaze.”69  She continues to explain that “[c]hoice is everything. But Westerners should 
recognise that when a woman in France or Britain chooses a veil, it is not necessarily a sign of 
her repression.”70 
Karima Bennoune, liberal feminist and associate professor at Rutgers School of Law, 
argues that interpreting the right to manifest religion through the veil in a context-specific way is 
necessary to appropriately consider the “socially constructed meaning(s) of the expression and its 
impact on sex equality” in any evaluation of restrictions on religious expression through dress-
appearance.71  Bennoune posits that the Islamic veil, as a recognized manifestation of religious 
expression under international human rights law, is rightly excluded from the European public 
sphere by dress-appearance restrictions in order to protect gender equality and female autonomy 
in secularly neutral societies.72  
To support her position, Bennoune essentially asserts that religious freedom and the 
manifestation of religious belief which are established human rights, may, in certain instances, 
negatively deter international strides to achieve substantive gender equality, an equally important 
human right within a secular context.73  Therefore, “[s]ome limitations are justified, but 
necessitate careful, contextual scrutiny.74  While Bennoune does note that broader debate 
surrounding religious-dress appearance and gender equality should not only focus on the Islamic 
veil, her analysis leads one to understand that an individual or collective right of women to dress 
based on spiritual and cultural convictions is necessarily overridden by social policies upholding 
secular human rights imperatives for women-kind.75  Unfortunately, this approach undercuts the 
                                                
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Bennoune, supra note 21, at 375. 
72 Id. at 374.  
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 375.  
75 Id.  
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cultural and religious complexities of the Islamic veil and the freedom of Muslim women to act 
on their religious beliefs in public life. It also fails to consider the importance of what Edith Wu, 
professor at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law, calls “dress-appearance diversity” that may 
be effective in achieving modern gender equality by combating dominant cultural, social or 
religious norms.76  
By touting the conclusion that religious devotion is counterproductive to women’s 
agency,77 universalist/liberalist feminism by all accounts has turned the Muslim woman “into an 
allegory for undesirable cultural difference.”78  Veiled Muslim women are completely written off 
and are “[p]aradoxically portrayed both as a victim (passive) of her oppressive patriarchal 
culture/religion and male kin, and as a threat (active) to Western modernity and culture of 
freedoms.”79  However, other theoretical feminist approaches like postmodern and postcolonial 
feminism, while not completely intersectional, have attempted to understand the Islamic veil as a 
transformative concept of self and account for values of morality, modesty and piety as 
important factors of a woman’s religious agency.80  
Religious agency is conspicuously missing from liberal feminist thought on the Islamic 
veil, and instead religious devotion is viewed as counter to ‘rational-choice-oriented strategies.’81 
In fact, it is easier to wrongly generalize all veiled women’s experiences and oversimplify the 
nature of the veil as something contrary to gender equality, because “fighting for the 
acknowledgment of the nuances of Muslim women’s individual experiences of covering up is 
                                                
76 Edieth Y. Wu, Cross-Cultural Patriarchal Demands on Women's Dress-Appearance, 33 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 
169, 172-73 (2012). 
77 Sirma Bilge, Beyond Subordination vs. Resistance: An Intersectional Approach to the Agency of Veiled Muslim 
Women, 31 J. INTERCULTURAL STUD., 1, 21 (2010), DOI: 10.1080/07256860903477662. 
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Id.  
80 Id at 21. 
81 Id.  
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still something of a suicide mission.”82  However, postmodern and postcolonial feminism do not 
make unveiling a pre-condition for women to enjoy individual and religious rights like liberal 
feminism. Instead they attempt to expand the dialogue to include the most undervalued aspect of 
a woman’s dress-appearance: her choice.  Perhaps no Western conception of feminism 
encapsulates the complexity of the Islamic veil in relation to gender equality and religious 
adherence, but as a tool to strengthen religious agency, postcolonial and postmodern feminism 
appear to confer a substantial deference to the rights of Muslim women to choose to veil in 
Western secular society.  
IV. EUROPEAN SECULAR LIBERALISM AND RELIGIOUS DRESS-
APPEARANCE RESTRICTIONS 
 
The Strasbourg Court maintains secular liberalism as the dominant European social order 
by interpreting positive freedom through a Western understanding of individual autonomy and 
self-interest.83  This framework ultimately manages culture and religion by relying on “certain 
substantive conceptions of both the scope of religious freedom and the nature of the public 
sphere.”84  This normative structure preserves the kind of European liberalism that is so 
detrimental to the choice by Muslim women to veil in Europe.  
The term “religion” and its scope are not formally defined by human rights instruments, 
which fail to enumerate accepted religious practices and methods of worship. This gives 
European states the capability to regulate manifestations of religion like dress-appearance 
because the structural concept of religious freedom relies on liberal neutrality as a substantive 
political value.85  The Strasbourg Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence on religious dress-appearance 
                                                
82 Tracy Clark-Flory, Feminists face off over the veil, SALON, (Sept. 5, 2009). 
http://www.salon.com/2009/09/05/veil_debate/. 
83 Danchin, supra note 20, at 82. 
84 Id. at 86. 
85 Id. at 78. 
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regulations in Europe has established that statutory restrictions (couched in facially neutral 
terms) on the Islamic veil in public forums do not violate the freedom of religion if it is directed 
toward a legitimate aim, carried out pursuant to domestic law; and necessary in a democratic 
society.  The consequences of these cases, however, seem to have a disproportionate and 
negative impact on Muslim women who are forced to remove their veils in the public space.  
There are three important aspects of religious freedom jurisprudence on the Islamic veil 
that have led to an unjustifiable imposition on the rights of Muslim women to veil in Europe. 
First, religious dress-appearance restrictions, and the corresponding Strasbourg Court 
jurisprudence, are missing the critical distinction between choice and force of women as a factor 
of regulation schemes.86  Instead, states justify these restrictions by purporting that the Islamic 
veil inhibits free democratic societies, infringes on the rights of other women, or serves as a 
symbol of male patriarchy and coercion.87  Second, the wide margin of appreciation given to 
states by the Strasbourg Court used to assess individual claims unsatisfactorily addresses the 
socio-cultural and religious disadvantages imposed on veiled Muslim women in European 
secular societies enforcing these restrictions.88  Third, religious dress-appearance restrictions, 
while seemingly neutral on their face, have a disproportionate impact on Muslim women who 
practice Islamic veiling in Europe because it is increasingly used to as a “powerful and 
overdetermined marker of difference” to shape their individual religious identities.89  
                                                
86  Evan Darwin Winet, Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: State Interests and the Right to Cover the Face, 35 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 250 (2012). 
87 Id. (Arguments contravening these supposed rationales point out that there is no compelling state interest in 
prohibiting face coverings where there is no reasonable apprehension of an imminent crime by those individuals, 
that “there exists no positive right granted by national or international law (in France, in any case) to be allowed to 
see the bare face of another person” which negates the proposition that there is a duty owed to others to reveal faces 
in public, and that “States that have contemplated niqab bans have produced no evidence that veiling is coerced”). 
88 Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis, "Taking Religion Seriously"? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe-Some Problems of 
Adjudication, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 599, 601, 616 (2009). 
89  Id. at 600 (citing Claire Dwyer, Veiled Meanings: Young British Muslim Women and the Negotiation of 
Difference, 6 GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 5, 5 (1999)). 
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A. The Distinction Between Choice and Force In Religious-Dress Appearance 
Restrictions 
 
Under the European Convention, states do not have discretion to determine the 
legitimacy of the means used to express religious beliefs. This was the holding in Manoussakis 
and Others v. Greece.90  Under this principle, states should not have discretion to determine 
whether the Islamic veil constitutes a legitimate manifestation of a sincerely held religious belief. 
However, states have passed laws banning the veil on the assumption that it has a proselytizing 
effect and undermines secular liberalism.  
In S.A.S v. France, a widely-publicized and highly controversial decision, the Strasbourg 
Court heard a Muslim woman’s claim under Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the European Convention 
that she was forced to remove her niqab (full face veil) in public under a 2010 law. 91  In 
response to Court questioning, the applicant stated she was not forced to veil and she wore it at 
various times based on religious conviction.92  Although she agreed to remove the niqab when 
undergoing an identity check or in a secure facility, the Court found that the French law 
prohibiting the concealment of the face in public spaces was proportionate to achieving the 
legitimate state aim of “living together” (“le vivre ensemble”).93  
The French Resolution, which was passed by the French parliament as Law 
no. 2010-1192, asserted that the niqab was a radical practice and that France must prevent 
individuals from relying on freedoms of expression, opinion or belief, which undermined the 
                                                
90 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece [GC], Nn. 18748/91 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 1365 (1996). (The Strasbourg Court found 
that the Greek legislation forbidding proselytism and establishing houses of worship without authorization by the 
Greek Orthodox Church was a violation of Article 9 because it was not proportionate to the state aim nor was it 
necessary in a democratic society.) 
91 S.A.S. v. France, no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R at ¶ 3. 
92  Id. at ¶ 54. 
93  Id. at ¶¶ 157-59. 
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principles of French secular society.94  Additionally, the Court examined an explanatory 
memorandum in the legislative history of Law no. 2010-1192 which stated, “the concealment of 
the face in public places brings with it a symbolic and dehumanising violence,” constituting a 
“public manifestation of a conspicuous denial of equality between men and women.”95  
Analyzing coercion on women’s dress-appearance is a double-sided coin, especially in 
the public sphere. Women are forced to remove the Islamic veil in the public sphere through 
state regulations which, in turn, apparently aim to prevent the coercion of women to wear the veil 
by members of their own community.96  For example, part of the rationale underlying the 2010 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in 
Europe was to advocate that “member states take all necessary measures to stamp out radical 
Islamism and Islamophobia, of which women are the prime victims,” especially where the 
“social and cultural tradition” of the Islamic veil threatens women’s dignity and freedom.97  The 
French Resolution unequivocally stated that “[n]o woman should be compelled to wear religious 
apparel by her community or family.  Any act of oppression, sequestration or violence 
constitutes a crime that must be punished by law.”98  
                                                
94 Id. at ¶ 24 (The May 2010 Resolution “on attachment to respect for Republic values at a time when they are being 
undermined by the development of radical practices” states the following: 
“1. Considers that radical practices undermining dignity and equality between men and women, one of which 
is the wearing of the full veil, are incompatible with the values of the Republic; 
2. Affirms that the exercise of freedom of expression, opinion or belief cannot be relied on by anyone for the 
purpose of flouting common rules, without regard for the values, rights and duties which underpin society; 
3. Solemnly reaffirms its attachment to respect for the principles of dignity, liberty, equality and fraternity 
between human beings; 
4. Expresses the wish that the fight against discrimination and the promotion of equality between men and 
women should be a priority in public policies concerning equal opportunities, especially in the national 
education system; 
5. Finds it necessary for all appropriate means to be implemented to ensure the effective protection of women 
who suffer duress or pressure, in particular those who are forced to wear the full veil.”) 
95 Id. at ¶ 6, ¶ 25. 
96  Id. at ¶ 35. 
97 Id.  
98 S.A.S. v. France, no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R at ¶ 35. 
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The main problem is that the state carries almost no burden to show that a woman was in 
fact coerced by another to veil or to show that her choice to veil somehow infringes on others 
rights in society; this is particularly true when legal and social norms are manipulated to restrict 
women’s choices, “especially when that choice does not have an imminently harmful impact on 
society as a whole.”99  The consideration of a woman’s capacity to consent to covering her body 
or face for her own moral, spiritual, or political purposes is absent from the multitude of 
discussions surrounding the veil at the domestic and international level.  
Even if a Muslim woman were coerced to wear the veil, France advocated for, and the 
Strasbourg Court accepted, a justification for the ban based on protecting the rights and freedoms 
of others to live together under certain conditions, not the right of that woman to be free from 
coercion.100  Therefore, the distinction between coercion and consent was of no consequence to 
the Strasbourg Court in S.A.S. Under Article 225-4-10 of Law no. 2010-1192, France 
criminalized the act of forcing, by duress or threats, another person to conceal their face in 
public.101  As a French goal, this would be a perfectly acceptable state objective had the law only 
issued criminal penalties on those who coerced the women to veil, and not on the veiled women 
themselves. Instead the law does not necessarily make clear the difference of wearing the niqab 
to express and manifest a religious belief as a personal choice, and wearing the niqab under 
coercion by other members of a minority community.  
This aspect of the French legislation clearly demonstrates the heavy liberal feminist 
influence on European misunderstandings of Islam and the endorsement of these 
misunderstandings in the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. Susanna Mancini, Professor of 
Public Comparative Law at the University of Bologna Law School, writes about universal 
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liberalism’s “orientalist” framework which “structure[s] the very object it speaks about and from 
its capacity to articulate a convincing discourse of the other, thus establishing the identity of the 
subject that characterizes the identity of the other.”102  By implying that coercion would 
necessarily be a factor in a woman’s wearing of the niqab and that preventing such coercion is a 
legitimate state interest in justifying the niqab ban, both France and the Strasbourg Court 
condone the idea that an imagined Islamic patriarchy is fundamentally incompatible with 
European secular democracy.  Muslim women require the state’s protection against harmful 
subjugation embodied in the veil.  
Instead, postmodern and postcolonial approaches recognize the way that universal 
liberalists decontextualize aspects of non-Western culture and religion, like the veil.  These 
theories reject the universal liberalist method of highlighting key differences between it and non-
Western society, leading to an institutional “othering” of Muslim women.  This “othering” is 
defined by Islam’s offensive patriarchal system where the Muslim woman holds “a masculine 
subject position.”103  Mancini articulates that this liberalist process of “othering” is crucial to 
maintaining its credibility when she states, “Western feminism (and the Western self, more 
generally) reaches its path to autonomy through engagement in a process of differentiation with 
its non-Western (Oriental) Other.”104  An agency-based theoretical approach can deconstruct the 
Western liberalist assumption that veiled Muslim women, as the “other”, are passive victims of 
false consciousness or are in fact coerced in a systemic patriarchal culture.105  Indeed, “[t]hey 
make choices about their religious practice, their professional activity, their family and so forth, 
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and they do so within the particular contexts which make choices meaningful to them and to the 
community (or communities) to which they belong.”106 
On the other hand, some scholars dismiss the distinction of choice and coercion as 
unpersuasive in the context of a secular state.  Frances Raday, law professor and a member of the 
Working Group on Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, writes: 
For every woman in a liberal democracy who chooses the burkah there are other 
women who are compelled to wear the burkah in the context of family or 
community patriarchal control . . . Furthermore, globally, many millions of the 
women who wear burkahs do not choose to wear them but are forced to wear 
them in regimes where modesty police will impose corporal punishment for their 
failure to do so. The choice of a handful of women in democratic countries to 
wear the burkah is perhaps an ethnic and religious identification symbol but it is 
also a symbol of identification with women’s oppression. The justified fear of 
human rights protagonists that criticism of Moslem religious practices in Europe 
is an instrumentalist weapon of ethnic hatred should be addressed but cannot 
justify condoning practices harmful to women.107 
 
Raday reduces the veil to a patriarchal symbol of oppression, even where Muslim women 
veil freely in Western democracies.108  Their freedom to manifest and express their religious 
beliefs is restricted by laws that punish them for wearing a veil viewed as a harmful practice 
towards women by “human rights protagonists.”109 This attitude is a direct reflection of the 
powerful belief of liberal feminists that Islamic veil is overwhelmingly a symbol of oppression 
and should be banned from the public sphere to promote gender inequality.110  
The false consciousness theory posits that Muslim women do not willingly choose to 
wear the Islamic veil because agency simply does not exist in the form of religiously motivated 
submission to a spiritual authority.111  Liberal feminist agency only exits in the form of one’s 
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“capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental 
will, or other obstacles,” thereby locating “the political and moral autonomy of subjects in the 
face of power.”112  Laws banning the Islamic veil exemplify this liberal feminist stereotype, 
ultimately detracting from Muslim autonomy over their bodies, appearance, and religion.  On the 
other hand, postmodern feminism advocates moving past the belief that the Islamic veil is a 
threatening and undesirable symbol because female experiences of expression are socio-
culturally relative but nonetheless subjectively meaningful.113  It is one framework the Court may 
use to give credence to a Muslim woman’s religious agency by considering the context of her 
personal motivations and values of morality, modesty and piety. This can be done by examining 
the applicant’s capacity to consent to veil, and contextualizing the state’s interest in restricting 
personal religious observance through a preemptive deterrent against Islamic values in European 
society.  These considerations were undervalued by the Court in Sahin and S.A.S where it 
deferred, through a wide margin of appreciation, to the state’s interest in eliminating the veil as a 
visual mark of Islam in secular educational and political environments.  
France’s battle with, and fear of, the Islamic veil is legitimized through the Court’s one-
dimensional ruling in S.A.S. to what is in fact a complex clash of human rights.  The ruling 
brushes over the “othering” of veiled Muslim women by avoiding “confrontation with the 
competing set of rights, and did not develop any comprehensive legal assessment or 
methodology on the tension between women’s equality, human rights and religious freedoms to 
tackle these conflicts in a systemic manner.”114  
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The Court has actively avoided frank and substantive discussions on the clash between 
religious freedom and women’s rights in its jurisprudence.  To truly give meaning to religious 
freedom, the Court must discuss the Islamic veil’s “implications on women’s human rights and 
other contested considerations, such as state neutrality, equality and secularism” and “confront 
all aspects involving these cases and develop a legal methodology, as well as legal tests to unveil 
the true story of women’s liberties and religion.”115 
B. The Strasbourg Court’s Deferential Approach to States’ Margin of Appreciation 
The Strasbourg Court exercises significant deference to states’ margin of appreciation in 
determining whether dress-appearance policies restricting the expression of religious beliefs is a 
violation of Article 9 of the European Convention.116 The Court’s chosen approach also defers to 
the biased and anti-pluralistic rationales behind those policies.    
In Soile Lautsi and Others v. Italy, the Strasbourg Court’s Grand Chamber found that the 
display of a crucifix in State schools fell within the state’s margin of appreciation and was not an 
Article 9 violation because it did not constitute a form of indoctrination.117 Specifically, the 
Court found that displaying a crucifix did not constitute a demonstration of intolerance toward 
students of other religions or non-religious students, even though Christianity was the largest 
religion in Italy.118 Grégor Puppinck, a member of the Committee of Experts on the Reform of 
the European Court of Human Rights, elucidated the chief principle of the Lautsi case: the 
requirement of a neutral approach by states toward citizens and religious freedom.119 In Lautsi, 
the Court did not find that Italy’s preference to display a religious symbol – the crucifix- in 
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schools infringed on the religious rights of the students because it did not involve coercion to act 
or believe in a specific religious ideology.120  
The Lautsi Court’s perspective on coercion from religious symbols in schools was later 
revisited in Dahlab v. Switzerland, in which the Court determined that the coercive and 
indoctrinating effect of the hijab (a religious symbol expressed through dress-appearance) worn 
by female Muslim teachers was contrary to the principle of secularism; thus, Switzerland was 
permitted to ban the garment from schools.121 In Dahlab, the Strasbourg Court concluded that a 
school regulation prohibiting teachers, as representatives of the state, from wearing the hijab 
while carrying out their professional duties did not constitute a violation of the right to manifest 
religion where that right was outweighed by the need to “protect pupils by preserving religious 
harmony” in the classroom.122 The Court addressed the underlying perceptions of the hijab and 
explicitly stated:  
It is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the 
wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of 
very young children. The applicant’s pupils were aged between four and eight, an 
age at which children wonder about many things and are also more easily 
influenced than older pupils. In those circumstances, it cannot be denied outright 
that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect, 
seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in 
the Koran and which  . . . is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It 
therefore appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with 
the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils.123 
 
The margin of appreciation doctrine as applied to religious dress-appearance restrictions 
under Article 9(2) of the European Convention has been criticized as unsatisfactorily subjecting 
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state actions to sufficient judicial scrutiny, which disadvantages Muslim who wear religiously 
inspired clothing for its spiritual importance.124  A significant factor that contributes to the 
inconsistent interpretation of Article 9(2) by the Court is its varying application of the 
democratic necessity test to prove the State’s response to a pressing social need under the 
contested legal restriction.125  Bennoune supports state restrictions on the Islamic veil when the 
restriction’s purpose and effect is to prevent female subordination in public education.”126 
However, a major weakness in this supposed justification is the fact that states are not required 
by the Court to demonstrate an actual showing of female subordination.  In Dahlab, the Court 
granted Switzerland a wide margin of appreciation in its determination that the restriction was 
necessary in a democratic society where it was proportionate to the state aims of “ensuring the 
neutrality of the State primary-education system” and of “protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others, public order and public safety.”127 
The Court’s ready acceptance of the belief that the hijab as an Islamic symbol is 
incompatible with democratic secular values is concerning in Dahlab. Danchin writes,  
It is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external symbol such as the 
There is no detailed discussion of the teaching on clothing or of the different 
interpretations that it is given in different Muslim societies and by different 
Muslim scholars. The vague, broad-brush approach to the issue by the Court 
seems to rely on the popular Western view - that the Qur'an and Islam are 
oppressive to women and there is no need to be more specific or to go into any 
detail about this because it is a self-evident, shared understanding of Islam.128  
 
Puppinck importantly identifies that both Dahlab and Lautsi concern the display of 
religious symbols in schools and the impressionability of students in schools.129  The Court 
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stated that there was no violation of the students’ external liberty or freedom of conscience by 
displaying a crucifix in Lautsi because it did not project elements of indoctrination, coercion or 
proselytism that forced students to act against their conscience.130  But according to the Court, 
the hijab restriction in the Dahlab case (constituting an interference of individual freedom to 
manifest one’s beliefs under Article 9) was in fact justified because the hijab’s proselytizing 
effect in an Italian school was incompatible in a “non-confessional education system.”131  
The interpretations of religious symbols in schools from these two cases are inconsistent 
and have yet to be rectified by the Court.  The liberalist interpretation of the hijab as a tool of 
indoctrination in Dahlab, especially among young students, enforces the presumption that the 
Islamic veil is incompatible with secular democracy whereas displaying a crucifix in a public 
school in a majority Catholic country does not have the same coercive effect.  The Court must 
interpret the right to manifest religion in a context-specific way by accounting for the socially 
constructed meanings of religious expression and its impact on sex equality in Europe.  A 
postmodern and postcolonial feminist analysis may shift the jurisprudential direction on Islamic 
veil restrictions by granting more latitude to personal and individual religious convictions and 
their value in a pluralistic society.  
Significantly, the Court defers to a state’s margin of appreciation where religious dress-
appearance restrictions are enforced through laws of general applicability and are not unjustly 
targeting a specific religion. A famous Article 9 case decided by the Strasbourg Court was Şahin 
v. Turkey, which held that a student’s religious freedom was not violated by a university’s ban on 
religious clothing on its campus.132  The Court recognized that particular deference is granted to 
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states giving weight to democratic social values “[w]here questions concerning the relationship 
between State and religions are at stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may 
reasonably differ widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special 
importance.”133 
The Court invoked the margin of appreciation in Sahin because there is no “European 
consensus on how to address the role of ostensible religious symbols or attire in public 
schools.”134  Turkey argued, and the Court accepted, that that Turkey’s aim to uphold secularism 
in the face of “fundamentalist groups . . . targeting women's dress in higher education as part of a 
project to undo secularism” by prohibiting the hijab in universities was “necessary to achieve a 
legitimate aim.”135 The predominantly male panel in Sahin determined that the restriction was 
not considered discriminatory because it did not single out the Islamic veil but instead prohibited 
all clothing that symbolized religion or political ideology.136  Even though Turkey relaxed its 
hijab restrictions in 2013 for civil society workers in order to encourage conservative women to 
seek public employment and education, understanding Turkey’s original motivation’s for its 
hijab ban is important to realize the broader consequences for veiled Muslim women living under 
a European secular governing structure.  
The “hands off approach” to religious freedom used by the Court in deferring to the 
states’ margin of appreciation in these cases “contradicts the necessarily counter-majoritarian 
nature of human rights, particularly where protection of minorities is concerned.”137  Secular 
neutrality and liberal democracy are still ill-defined concepts according to Stephanie Berry, legal 
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adviser for the applicant in S.A.S.,138 who emphasizes that the wording of Article 9 distinctly 
indicates a right to freedom of religion or belief, not a right to freedom from religion or belief.139  
Even where the Court may consider the specific social context and history of France, the 
Court must still ensure that religious minorities can exercise their religious freedom, especially 
where states like France justify dress-appearance restrictions on the concept of “living together” 
which is ultimately a policy of forced integration and assimilation of veiled Muslim women.140 
C. Facially Neutral Dress-Appearance Restrictions and Their Disproportionate Impact 
on Veiled Muslim Women’s Freedom of Religion 
Sovereign states like France and Turkey maintain national cultures that are proactively 
sheltered from foreign influence, including religion.141 Interestingly, the historical movement in 
Europe to create secular nation-states is “premised on distinctive “Protestant” conceptions of the 
autonomous individual, freedom, and religion.”142  Danchin argues that the movement to de-
politicize religion and emphasize freedom of conscience in the public sphere has shaped modern 
religious freedom jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.143  But the Court’s 
adjudication of claims of religious freedom violations does not prominently emphasize the role 
                                                
138 S.A.S. v. France, no. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R at ¶ 154. (It is significant to note the Strasbourg Court’s deference 
to the state’s margin of appreciation to create a policy banning the full face veil in public spaces. The Court 
specifically expressed its duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of Convention compliance where the 
justification for a state law regarding the requirements of a democratic society emerged from an assessment made by 
domestic policy-makers. By deferring to the state’s margin of appreciation in such a way, the Court found that the 
infringement of pluralism in France by the ban on expressing religious beliefs through dress-appearance (the Islamic 
full face veil) was outweighed by the state’s determination that it was an incompatible practice within French 
society). 
139 Stephanie Berry, SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?, BLOG OF THE 
EUROOPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (July 2, 2014). Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-
does-anything-remain-of-the-right-to-manifest-religion/. 
140 Id. 
141 Joel Richard Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2000). 
142 Danchin, supra note 20, at 76.  
143 Id.  
 
 
34 
of religion in the cultural and historical context of European secular society and Western 
Christianity.144 
The European approach to religious freedom is constructed within an existing legal and 
political order arising out of Protestant Christian values from which states “sought to remake 
[religion] through the agency of the law” rather than eliminating religion from the public 
sphere.145 But the European divide between the public and private spheres restricts the ability of 
a Muslim woman to veil and thus manifest her religious beliefs in the “secularly neutral” public 
sphere.146 Additionally, these secularist values uphold a particular understanding of human rights 
and gender equality that preserves the distinction between the freedom to manifest religion and 
the freedom of conscience and religious belief.147  
Unfortunately this bifurcation of spheres demonstrates that Muslim women cannot truly 
practice religion freely in European society because they are subject to gender norms and cultural 
expectations.148  This is made clear in European countries, which view the hijab as unwelcome 
because it embodies unacceptable degradation and subordination of women in a free society.  
Europe’s unique conception of secularism and its historical relationship to the values of 
Western Christianity is illustrated by the French concept of laïcité (secularism).  The country’s 
historical political struggle against the French Catholic Church reinforces the essential French 
position that the Islamic veil is incompatible with republicanism because it symbolizes religious 
indoctrination and undermines the basic freedom of conscience.149  What ultimately makes the 
Islamic veil incompatible with French secularism though, is the underlying principle that French 
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democracy is an “an inherently benevolent, progressive and emancipatory institution” that 
liberates citizens from the formidable social forms of oppression embodied in “civil society and 
in particular in traditional identities and religions.”150  Many French feminists therefore believe 
that the Islamic veil represents a denial of individual dignity, “legitimizing the oppression of 
vulnerable individuals in the name of tradition, culture or religion.”151  
In its S.A.S decision, the Strasbourg Court examined the legislative history of the full-face 
veil ban (Law no. 2010-1192), which demonstrated a targeted objective of the French parliament 
to eradicate the practice of the niqab in France.152  A French parliamentary commission 
published a 2009 report criticizing the niqab as a contrary practice to Republican values, as 
incompatible with secularism, and as “a symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very 
existence, negated both the principle of gender equality and that of the equal dignity of human 
beings.”153  The parliamentary report advocated for a niqab ban and for enacting “legislation 
guaranteeing the protection of women who were victims of duress, which would strengthen the 
position of public officials confronted with this phenomenon and curb such practices.”154  
The Court noted an opinion issued by the the National Advisory Commission on Human 
Rights (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme – CNCDH) in 2010 which 
discouraged any general or absolute laws banning the full face veil under the guise of 
maintaining public order which would stigmatize Muslims and negatively affect women who 
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refused to remove their veils.155 The CNCDH opinion “took the view, in particular, that the 
principle of secularism alone could not serve as a basis for such a general measure, since it was 
not for the State to determine whether or not a given matter fell within the realm of religion” and 
“emphasized the risk of stigmatising Muslims and pointed out that a general prohibition could be 
detrimental to women, in particular because those who were made to wear the full-face veil 
would additionally become deprived of access to public.”156  But the Court did not find it 
significant that “the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim women who wish to wear the full-face 
veil” because the law was “not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in 
question.”157 
The Conseil d’État opined that it would be “impossible to recommend a ban on the full 
veil alone, as a garment representing values that were incompatible with those of the Republic, in 
that such a ban would be legally weak and difficult to apply in practice” under the principles of 
gender equality and personal freedom.158  However, the Conseil d’État recommended that a more 
general legislation be enacted to restrict concealing the face in public based on public order 
considerations.159  The legislative history demonstrates that although the law was written as an 
absolute ban on any concealment of the face in public, it was a targeted effort to cease the 
practice of the niqab by Muslim women in French territory as an unacceptable challenge to 
gender equality and secular neutrality.  
The French law criminalizing the Islamic veil as a religious symbol by default 
criminalizes the manifestation of religion and has a particularly detrimental impact on Muslim 
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women who choose not to conform to the ban and are thus confined to the private sphere.160 
Indeed, the French principle of laïcité ultimately implies a certain moral relativism and 
consequently a forced privatization of religion for veiled Muslim French nationals by the state 
through coercive dress-appearance restrictions.  One can coherently argue that these liberal 
feminist restrictions amount to undue state infringement on a woman’s freedom of religion and 
manifestation of belief. In the case of S.A.S, the universalist “liberation” of veiled Muslim 
women, justified by French laïciste, “unhelpfully dramatizes the stark choice faced by Muslim 
women: that between asserting their identity as women (against sexism and patriarchy) or as 
Muslims (against Western stereotypes and Islamophobia).”161  
Contemporary postmodern and postcolonial theories identify the personal desires, 
religious beliefs, and even political statements women make by wearing the veil.  These feminist 
theories, with their more complex approaches to the multifaceted identities of Muslim women, 
are better suited to overcome the “simple patterns of social domination that might, in the past, 
have justified paternalistic intervention in the interests of individual autonomy and 
emancipation.”162  Additionally, these theoretical dimensions may be more receptive to a multi-
cultural approach in a democratic society which, if not embracing Muslim religion and culture, 
will certainly tolerate the different customs of veiling, because “tolerance demands that liberal 
cultures tolerate the existence of non-liberal cultures alongside their own culture.”163    
The Court’s decision in S.A.S allowed the French government to segregate religious garb 
from the public sphere, in effect reducing the pluralistic composition of France’s society and 
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leaving the applicant’s underlying claim without remedy.164  Some states further restrict religious 
freedom from the public sphere “if it collides with the basic foundations of that given society, be 
that secularity, assimilation, or both.”165  The perception that Islam, especially in a women’s 
rights context, is illiberal fuels arguments by liberal feminist scholars and academics that 
advocate interventionist approaches and undermine Muslim women’s vision of progress within 
their own communities.166 
The Court’s analysis of religious dress restrictions’ proportionality to the compelling 
interest of the state is critical where the evidence for undue state infringement on a woman’s 
“knowing, informed, and un-coerced decision to wear her headscarf in the workplace” is strong 
and not counteracted by other factors including the employer’s objectives and inherent job 
requirements of the employee.167  If a woman has the ability to undercut the state’s assertion that 
“wearing a headdress of this kind is a political symbol of female submission and therefore 
violates the religious and political neutrality required of all civil servants,”168 she can bolster her 
claim of undue infringement on manifestation of belief. In a contextual approach, the female 
applicant should provide evidence of before the Court that answers the question “whether 
deployment of the symbol causes, magnifies, or otherwise constitutes discrimination against 
women in that particular locale.”169  But even so, as long as the Court maintains a purely 
liberalist perspective, it is unlikely to accept this type of claim by a Muslim female applicant. 
The liberalist approach comprises of a distinct intolerance toward certain overt practices of 
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religion and considers them to be extreme or oppressive.  As such, this perspective fuels the 
position that gender equality can never be compatible with religious symbols like the veil. 170  
V. CONCLUSION 
European secular liberalism, as a governing framework, maintains the perception that the 
Islamic veil is a symbol that undermines democratic social values. It inherently contributes to 
the conflict between gender equality and religious freedom within human rights law.  It fuels the 
liberal feminist “othering” of veiled Muslim women in Western countries and perpetuates the 
theory of false consciousness.  The forced choice Muslim women make between gender equality 
and religious freedom is clearly insufficient to solve and implement the pluralistic rights of 
women in the twenty-first century.171  
The Strasbourg Court’s Article 9 jurisprudence as applied to state regulations on the 
Islamic veil and as it stands now, “implies a strong possibility of over-identification with religion 
at the expense of (most relevantly, but not exclusively) gender.”172 The Court does not discuss 
the effects of this kind of intersectionality in analyzing religious accommodations in European 
societies or even as a prevalent women’s issue.  Without a critical analysis of gender and 
religious identities, the Court will never achieve a comprehensive legal understanding of how 
women, and especially Muslim women, practice and take ownership of their individual 
identities. Without a shift away from a liberal feminist theoretical structure that perpetuates 
existing stigmas, the Court will never provide appropriate remedies for institutionalized 
discrimination. 
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The Strasbourg Court must reconsider its approach to religious freedom jurisprudence to 
truly remedy claims of religious freedom violations.  The Court’s current neutral application of 
abstract international principles embodied in the European Convention have proven inadequate 
to remedy significant limitations on veiled Muslim women’s autonomy and identity.  The 
Court’s absolutist approach to liberalism in international law through the margin of appreciation 
is more concerned with the sovereignty of states, procedural equality, and the maintenance of the 
public and private spheres than with substantive equality for religious observers and individual 
rights of citizens.  At the very least, European states should be required under Article 9 to 
demonstrate that women have in fact been coerced to wear the Islamic veil, or to demonstrate 
that the choice to wear religious symbols has an imminently harmful impact on its democratic 
society before it enforces religious dress-appearance restrictions.  This approach, using third 
wave postcolonial/postmodern feminist theory, would move beyond a mechanical application of 
the margin of appreciation into a socio-political and cultural discussion that seeks a more just 
outcome for veiled Muslim women, and all other spiritual women seeking to peacefully practice 
their faith identities in the public sphere.  
The difference between liberal feminism and postcolonial/postmodern feminism lies in 
the assumptions about the legal system’s application of international principles to gender 
equality and the Islamic veil.  Liberal feminism assume that the law will achieve a neutral, 
impartial, and just outcome through a rational approach to clear violations of gender bias.  
However, it has been proven in many of the Strasbourg Court’s religious dress-appearance 
restriction cases that the outcomes for veiled women are not in the truest sense of the word, just. 
The deference given to states that use biases, stereotypes, and political goals to target the Islamic 
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veil shrouded in neutrally worded statues that prohibit all religious symbols in the public sphere 
has significant consequences for religious female identity in European society.  
Although not completely without its own flaws, postmodern/postcolonial feminism 
accepts the Islamic veil as a manifestation of religious belief and means of worship instead of 
characterizing it as a one-dimensional symbol of patriarchal sexism.  This school of feminism 
also recognizes the religious agency of veiled Muslim women, and considers the diverse socio-
cultural contexts surrounding the debate over the veil.  
The Strasbourg Court should recognize that its primary role is not to advance sovereign 
rights over individual human rights.  As long as the Court upholds state bans on the Islamic veil, 
it continues to suggest that “women have only one way to exercise their rights correctly, and it 
regulates them accordingly.”173  The one-dimensional operation of international law in the cases 
examined in this paper overshadows the complex and personal stories of veiled women by 
consistently embracing state narratives and priorities that marginalize the force of religion in its 
own societies in the lives of its citizens.  
Challenging the Court’s normative application, and discriminatory outcomes, of Article 9 
jurisprudence may provide an opportunity to strengthen and elevate diverse female voices, like 
those of veiled Muslim women, in the review of dress appearance restrictions.  Challenging the 
Article 9 jurisprudence will help break the institutionalization of a harmful stereotype of the 
Islamic veil that relegates religious women to the corners of European society.  Women who 
have made a conscious choice to wear the Islamic veil need governmental and judicial protection 
of their religious freedom and of the ability to embrace the dynamic aspects of their gender, 
religion, identity, and autonomy in a secular Western society. Without this protection, veiled 
women will continue to live under a restrictive form of covernance - a discriminatory system of 
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governance that restricts the way they manifest their religious belief by covering their bodies in 
the public sphere.  
